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Abstract
To be effective, current intrusion detection systems
(IDSs) must incorporate artiﬁcial intelligence methods for
plan recognition. Plan recognition is critical both to pre-
dicting the future actions of attackers and planning appro-
priate responses to their actions. However network security
placesanew setof requirementson planrecognition. Inthis
paper we present an argument for including plan recogni-
tion in IDSs and an algorithm for conducting plan recog-
nition that meets the needs of the network security domain.
1. Introduction
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) must move from de-
scribing actions that have already happened to predicting
future actions. For IDSs to fulﬁll their desired role, they
must be able to analyze the actions of a hacker
￿ , infer the
hackers goals, and make predictions about their future ac-
tions. Intheartiﬁcialintelligence(AI)literaturethis process
ofdeducingan agent’sgoals fromobserved actions iscalled
plan recognition or task tracking. We argue that plan recog-
nition must be a central component in future IDSs.
However, most existing AI literature on intent recogni-
tion makes a number of assumptions preventing its applica-
tion to the computer network security domain. In our previ-
ouswork[8] wehave describedan approachto planrecogni-
tion that does not make the restrictive assumptions of other
AI intent recognition systems. In this paper we discuss its
application to the network security domain.
Other work in network security has argued for network
level coordination among IDSs[1, 6] and even referenced
infering attacker intent [9] as a motovation for this. How-
ever, these papers have focused on the protocols and com-
￿
We apologize for the use of the term “hacker” in its criminal sense,
but we will use this as a conventshort hand in this paper
munication issues surrounding this kind of distributed co-
ordination. In contrast, this paper focuses on the need for
and application of AI research in plan recognition to the
problems of network security and the inference of attacker
intent.
The remainder of this paper has the following structure.
First, we will argue that plan recognition is a crucial ad-
dition to network security work. Second we will provide
an overview of previous work in plan recognition. Third
we will describe our implemented theory of plan recogni-
tion for hostile agents for a computer network security do-
main. After presenting the formalization, we provide an
example, showing how the theory is used and how it differs
from previous approaches. Then we conclude with remarks
and plans for future work.
2. The Need for Plan Recognition
Current IDSs do not predict attacks; they do not provide
an early warning. They report the type and properties of an
attackafter ithashappened. Assuch thesesystemsareoften
reduced to the role of post mortem analysis rather than be-
ing proactive. While recognition of attacks is an important
ability, it falls short of the community’s vision for IDSs as
systemsthat predictfuture hackeractionsand automatically
and correctly respond to attacks in a timely manner.
Tobeproactive IDSsmustbe ableto inferthegoalsofat-
tackers. Identifying the attacks is not sufﬁcient. To see this,
consider the case of an IDS report of a synﬂood. For the
purposes of this example assume that the attacker it using
this synﬂood for one of two reasons.
1. DOS attack to prevent our use of the machine.
2. Suppressing a host during an IP spooﬁng attack on an-
other machine.
To correctly respond to this attack an IDS needs to un-
derstand the intent of the attacker, predict the next actions
of the attacker and then take actions to prevent these future
1actions. To see this, consider each of the possible intents in
turn.
First, suppose the attacker is using the synﬂood to pre-
vent our use of the machine. Knowing this, we would pre-
dict that the attacker’s future actions will be to continue the
ﬂood of SYN packets to suppress the machine. To respond
to this attack we can modify the ﬁrewall to reject packets
from the attacking host or to only allow a speciﬁed num-
ber of connections from the attacking host to the DOSed
machine. This is will effectively limit the number of open
connections and prevent the DOS attack.
Second,supposetheattackerisusingthesynﬂood aspart
of an IP spooﬁng attack and his goal is access to a different
machine entirely. Knowing this we would predict that we
would see packets that appear to originate from the sup-
pressed host, we might see the synﬂood stop on its own and
possibly the establishment of a connection from outside the
network to another host on the network (one the original
host trusted). To respond to this attack we should modify
the ﬁrewall to prevent all external connections to all ma-
chines that trust the synﬂooded machine.
Noticethat while the reportedactionisthe same, thecor-
rect response is completely different. In fact the response in
the ﬁrst case will have no effect if the attacker’s goal is ac-
cess to another machine. By the time the ﬁrewall has been
modiﬁed and the synﬂood clears the IP spooﬁng attack will
have been executed and the attacker willlikely already have
access to the machine. Conversely if the attackers real in-
tent is just to DOS the selected host, responding as though
an IP spooﬁng attack is underway will cut off connections
to other machines from the internet. In short, inferring that
the attacker’s goal is “access to the system” rather than “de-
nial of services”is critical in both making predictions about
what the attacker will do next and taking the correct coun-
termeasures.
What we are suggesting is that IDSs need to combine
multiple reports and information to identify the attacker’s
goals. In this case, there is a convenient clue to the at-
tacker’s intent: part of an IP spooﬁng attack is the sending
of packets to a host with the IP address of the DOSed host.
Given a network based IDS that can watch for these anoma-
lous packets, recognizing the synﬂood as a DOS versus part
of an IP spoof is relatively easy. Conversely if no spoofed
packetisobservedtheattackerislikelyengagingin asimple
DOS.
Thisexample illustratesthekindof reasoningthatwe are
advocating. By taking the output reports of current IDSs as
a stream of observed actions, and using intent recognition
techniques, it is possible to infer the attacker’s goals and
thus accurately direct responses. However this simple de-
scription paints too rosy a picture. Previous work on intent
recognition has made a number of simplifying assumptions
that would prevent its application to this domain. In the fol-
lowing section we will discuss these assumptions and the
requirementsplacedon planrecognitionsystemsby the net-
work security domain.
3. Requirements on Plan Recognition
The requirements that are placed on our plan recognition
system come from two different aspects of the network in-
trusion detection problem. First, we are attempting to infer
the plans of covert agents. As we already know hackers of-
ten take deliberate actions to “cover their tracks” and hide
their actions and intentions. This will place signiﬁcant re-
quirements on the process of plan recognition that are not
true when the agent being observed is cooperative.
Second, taking plan recognition in the computer secu-
rity domain seriously requires confronting a number of is-
sues that have not been examined in more theoretical or
academic domains. In this case, the plans the hackers are
following have properties that are not as prevalent in the
domains that have been the traditional areas for plan recog-
nition. In the following sections we will consider the re-
quirements placed on an effective plan recognition system
by these factors in turn. In each casewe will identify the re-
quirement and attempt to provide a motivating example for
it.
3.1. Hostile agents
Most previous work in plan recognitionhas assumed co-
operative agents. This domain makes this assumption un-
tenable. We have identiﬁedthe twosigniﬁcant requirements
that hostile agents place on plan recognition. They are the
ability to infer unobserved actions from observed actions
and inferring unobserved actions from observations of state
change We discuss these in turn.
Unobserved actions: Given that hackers may be us-
ing new exploits, it is entirely possible that they may have
actions that our current IDSs do not recognize. Consider
a conventional signature detector when faced with an un-
known exploit. Since it doesn’t have the signature for the
attack it will not report. In some cases, even small varia-
tions of an exploit can make an attack invisible to a signa-
ture detector.
Further in real networks there are often “holes” in the
IDSs coverage. That is, hosts that do not have sufﬁcient
sensor coverage to detect all of the malicious activities that
might occur on the system. Hackers entering a system
through one of these sensor holes will not be observed by
the system’s IDSs.
If our plan recognition system is to be successful in this
domain, it must be able to infer the occurrence of actions
that it has no report of when other evidence suggests they
have occurred. Consider the case of an attack on a singlemachine that is observed without any preliminary scanning.
Since we know that identifying the IP address and relevant
port numbers are important for this attack, we can infer that
some scanning or information-gathering action must have
occurred before the attack, even though we did not observe
it.
Observations of state changes: Consider the report of
a new service running on a host. Note that we distinguish
between a report of the action of starting the service and a
report that the service is now running and it previously was
not. The ﬁrst report would be generated by a host based
IDS that watched the hacker start the service. The report of
a state change might be generated by a network based IDS
thatscansto identifythat nounauthorizedservicesarebeing
run. In the ﬁrst case we see the action and in the second we
onlyobserve theeffect oftheaction; wereceive a report ofa
state change. From this state change we can infer that there
was an action that caused it.
Existing work has not examined the issue of reports of
state changes. In the case of cooperative agents there is no
need. If the agent is cooperative we can assume we have a
completelistoftheagent’sactions. Thereisno reasonto in-
fer the execution of unobserved actions from state changes;
the complete set of actions is already available. However
with an incomplete record of the agent’s actions, reports of
state change can provide evidence of unobserved actions.
3.2. Real World Computer Security
There are a number of requirements that we will place
on our plan recognition as a result of concerns that plan
recognition be incorporated into deployable IDSs. These
requirements include the ability to reason about: partially
ordered plans, multiple concurrent goals, actions used for
multiple effects, failing to observe an action, the effect of
world state on the attackers plans, and multiple possible hy-
potheses. We consider each of these in turn.
Partially ordered plans: The plans hackers follow are
often very ﬂexible in the ordering of their plans steps. Con-
sider system scanning by IP-sweeping and port scanning.
These steps can be interleaved in at least two orders.
1. Collect a large number of IP addresses and then port
sweeping each of them.
2. Port sweep each IP address as it is found.
Whileport sweepinga host can onlybe done after thehost’s
IP addresshas beenidentiﬁed, there areno other constraints
on the order of the actions. This means that thee port sweep
actionsfor a subdomainare not orderedwith respectto each
other but only with respect to the IP address discovery pro-
cess. In short, the port sweep actions can be executed in
many acceptable orderings.
In the AI planning and plan recognition literature, plans
that have this kind of ﬂexible ordering between the plan
steps are called partially ordered plans. In these cases, the
orderingconstraintsoftheplanonly establisha partial order
over the actions of the plan. In contrast when the ordering
constraints impose a total order on the actions of the plan
we call this a totally ordered plan.
Since the plans that are followed by the attackers have
this more ﬂexible, partially ordered structure, we will re-
quire that our system be able to recognize the multiple pos-
sible instantiation orderings created by these plans.
Multiple concurrent goals: Hackers often have multi-
ple goals. That is, a hacker might be interested in stealing
your sensitive corporate data as well as using your comput-
ers to launch attacks against other targets. Much previous
work in plan recognition has looked for the single goal that
best explains all the observations. In contrast we will re-
quire that our plan recognition system be able to consider
cases where the agent has multiple goals.
Actions used for multiple effects: Often in the com-
puter security domain a single action can be used for mul-
tiple effects. Consider the scanning of a subdomain. This
information can be used both for a DOS attack as well as
to identify the web server that hacker wants to deface. In
this case, it is not necessary for the attacker to perform this
same scan for each goal; they can do it once for both. In
effect they “overload” the scanning action and use it to con-
tributeto multiple goals. A critical requirementfor our plan
recognition system is that it be able to handle these kinds of
actions.
Failure to observe: Suppose we observe a scanning of
our subnetwork. The longer the we go without seeing any
further activity, the more likely we are to believe that this
was just an isolated scanning event. It was not part of a
larger plan. However, if right after the scanning event, we
see other malicious activity then we are more likely to be-
lieve the scan is the reconnaissance step of a plan.
In this case, since we are expecting to see malicious ac-
tivity following the scan, when we don’t see it, we change
ourbeliefinthelikelihoodthat thescanwaspartofanattack
and instead attribute it to a “random” scan. More formally,
the failure to observe actions that conﬁrm our hypothesis
results in lowering our estimate of how likely we think the
hypothesis is.
Consider thecase ofan IDS that is 99% effective at iden-
tifying a particularexploit. On the basis ofthis very reliable
detector we can make a number of inferences. One of the
most important is that if we don’t receive a report from the
detector then it is very unlikely that the attacker has exe-
cuted this exploit. In general, there are a signiﬁcant number
of conclusionsthat one can draw fromthe failureto observe
actions and we will require that our system be able to per-
form this kind of reasoning.Our previous commitment to considering agents with
multiple concurrent goals makes it even more critical that
our planrecognitionsystembe able to engagein thiskind of
reasoning. It is rare that we will be provided with deﬁnitive
evidence that an attacker is not pursing a speciﬁc goal. Far
more likely is that a lack of evidence for the goal will lower
its probability. As a result, reasoning on the basis of the
“failure to observe” is critical for a plan recognition system
to prefer those explanations where the agent is pursuing a
single goal over those where the attacker has multiple goals
but has not performed any of the actions for one of them.
Impact of world state on adopted plans: World state
can have signiﬁcant impact on the goals that are adopted
by an attacker. Consider the case of a computer network
security ﬁrm that has not locked down its public web-server
outside its ﬁrewall. When an attacker sees this we would
hardly ﬁnd it surprising if they adopt the goal of defacing
the ﬁrm’s web-page. In general, situational factors can have
a signiﬁcant effect on the goals adopted by agents in any
real world domain. We will require our plan recognition
algorithm be able to handle these effects.
Consideration of multiple possible hypotheses: Pro-
viding a single explanation for the observed actions in gen-
eral is not going to be ashelpful as ranking the possibilities.
Consider the case where all we observe is scanning activity.
Whilethis indicatesa hackerisinterestedinour network,by
itself it provides very little evidence about the hacker’s in-
tent. Rather than giving just one of the many equally likely
answers it is much more helpful to report the relative like-
lihood of each of the possibilities. This provides the in-
formation that there are multiple equally likely hypotheses
to explain the observations rather than a single most likely
one.
From here on, our discussion of issues and solutions will
be helped by a speciﬁc motivating example. Therefore the
following section will provide a brief introduction to our
planrepresentationand an example planlibrary that we will
use for the remainder of the paper. Following this introduc-
tory material we will discuss some background information
on the existing AI work in plan recognition and where it
has met the requirements we have speciﬁed and where it
has failed.
4. Plans
In this paper, we use simple hierarchical (task decompo-
sition) plans[5], as most plan recognition work does. We
assume that agents have a plan library that provides recipes
for achieving goals. Figure 1 shows a plan library for a
“hacker” in a simpliﬁed computer network intrusion exam-
ple.
If a hacker has a goal like stealing information from a
computer (theft), the plan library breaks that goal into ﬁve
steps: scan the system to determine vulnerabilities (recon),
exploit the system’s weaknesses to gain entry (break-in),
escalate privileges (gain-root), export desired data (steal),
and hide traces of presence on computer (clean). Order-
ing constraints within a method are represented by directed
arcs. For example, the hacker must break-in before she can
gain-root.
Finally, notice that there is a condition/event that is tied
to the action clean. The dashed line represents the fact
that this condition results from the execution of the action.
Thus, if clean is executed it will result in deleted event logs
(deleted-logs). This information about action effects will
be critical to inferring the execution of unobserved actions.
5. Plan recognition background
Plan recognition is the process of inferring the goals of
an agent from observations of an agent’s actions. Cohen,
PerraultandAllen[4] distinguishbetweentwokindsofplan
recognition, keyhole and intended plan recognition. In key-
hole recognition, the recognizer is simply watching normal
actions of an agent. The agent does not care or is not aware
that their actions are being observed. They are simply en-
gaging in the task. In intended recognition, the agent is co-
operative; its actions are done with the intent that they be
understood. This may result in the agent performing the ac-
tion in a particular or stylized way in an effort to assist the
recognizer in the task. Intended recognition arises, for ex-
ample, in cooperative problem-solving and in understand-
ing indirect speech acts. In these cases, recognizing the
intentions of the agent allows us to provide assistance or
respond appropriately.
From these two kinds we distinguish adversarial plan
recognition. It arises in contexts like network security, mil-
itary intelligence and game-playing, where the agent is ac-
tively hostile to the observation of their actions and the in-
ference of their plans. As we have pointed out already, ad-
versarial planrecognitionrequiresthe violationofa number
of assumptions that are reasonable in the cases of keyhole
and intended plan recognition.
The earliest work in plan recognition (e.g., [15, 19]) was
rule-based;researchersattemptedtocomeup withinference
rules that would capture the nature of plan recognition. To
the best of our knowledge, Charniak [3] was the ﬁrst to ar-
gue that plan recognition was best understood as a speciﬁc
form of the general problem of abduction, or reasoning to
thebest explanation. Abduction, asopposedto deduction or
induction, is reasoning from “A implies B” and knowledge
of “B” to deduce “A”. This is the reasoning pattern for most
kinds of diagnosis.
In 1986, Kautz and Allen (K&A) published “General-
ized Plan Recognition,” [12]. This work has framed almost
all subsequent work in plan recognition. K&A deﬁned thedeleted-logs
info
recon
clean
theft
clean
recon end steal gain-root break-in
vandalism
mod-webpage recon
deleted-logs
break-in end
Figure 1. A hierarchical plan library in diagram form.
problem as the problem of identifying a minimal set of top-
level actions sufﬁcient to explain the set of observed ac-
tions.
Plans were represented in a plan graph, with top-level
actions as root nodes and other actions as nodes implying
the top-level actions. To a ﬁrst approximation, the problem
of plan recognition was then a problem of graph covering.
They treated the problem as one of computing minimal ex-
planations, in the form of vertex covers, of the plan graph.
They formalized this in terms of McCarthy’s circumscrip-
tion.
For example, if one observed recon (See Figure 1) the
three minimal explanations would be:
￿
theft
￿
￿
￿
￿
vandalism
￿
￿
￿
￿
info
￿
Notice that, with only this observation we have no evidence
to rule out the possibility that the agent has multiple goals.
This single action could also explain two or even three top-
level goals like:
￿
theft
￿ vandalism
￿
or
￿
theft
￿ vandalism
￿ info
￿
However, K&A insistence on a minimal set of top-level ac-
tions prevents the consideration of these possibilities. Even
if they are equally likely. This violates our requirement of
the ability to supportmultiple concurrent goalsand the con-
sideration of multiple possible hypotheses.
Another problem for the use of K&A’s approach in the
networksecuritydomain isthat it does not take intoaccount
differences in the a priori likelihood of different plans.
Charniak and Goldman (C&G) [2] argued that, since plan
recognition involves abduction, it could best be done as
probabilistic (Bayesian) inference. Bayesian inference sup-
ports thepreferencefor minimalexplanations, in thecase of
hypotheses that are equally likely (as in the previous case.)
However, it also correctly handles explanations of the same
complexity but differentlikelihoods. For example, it is pos-
sible for a legitimate user to add a .rhosts ﬁle to a long dor-
mant account, but it is far more likely that we have had an
intrusion.
Two plan recognition situations that are not handled by
eitherK&AorC&Garetheproblemsofinﬂuencesfromthe
state of the world and evidence from failure to observe ac-
tions. As we discuss in Section 3 the state of the world will
inﬂuence an agent’s decision to pursue plans. K&A could
not take this into account, because they did not consider the
relative likelihood of plans. Even for C&G, however, it is
not simple to take this into account, because they deﬁned
their probability distributionsover the plan library.
The problem of evidence from failure to observe is a
more complex one. Consider what would happen if one
observed recon and break-in. Assuming that they were
equally likely a priori, one would conclude that either theft
or vandalism were equally good explanations (see Fig-
ure 1). However, as timewent by and one saw other actions,
withoutseeingmod-webpage, onewouldbecomemoreand
more certain that theft was the right explanation. Systems
like those of C&G and K&A, are not capable of reasoning
like this, because they do not consider plan recognition as a
problem that evolves over time. They cannot represent the
fact that an action has not been observed yet. They can only
be silentabout whetheran actionhas occurred— whichjust
meansthatthesystemhas failedtonoticetheaction,notthat
the action hasn’t occurred — or assert that an action has not
and will not occur.
Vilain [17] presented a theory of plan recognition as
parsing, based on K&A’s theory.
￿ Vilain does not actually
￿
This was not the ﬁrst attempt to cast plan recognition as parsing [16].propose parsing as a solution to the plan recognition prob-
lem. Instead, he uses the reduction of limited cases of plan
recognition to parsing in order to investigate the complex-
ity of K&A’s theory. The major problem with parsing as a
model of plan recognition is that it does not treat partially-
ordered plans or interleaved plans well. Indeed, partial or-
dering (clean and gain-root can be done in any order, as
long as break-in is done ﬁrst), would cause an explosion in
the size of Vilain’sgrammars.
There are grammatical formalisms that are powerful
enoughto capture interleaving. However, thecentral advan-
tageofparsingasamodel isthatit admitsofefﬁcient imple-
mentation when restricted to context-free languages. There
are context-free parsing algorithms that are
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ which
would make for very efﬁcient plan recognition. However if
we increase the power of the grammar to admit interleaved
plans these efﬁcient algorithms are no longer available to
us.
More recently, Wellman and Pynadath (W&P) [18] have
proposed a plan recognition method that is both probabilis-
tic and based on parsing. W&P represent plan libraries
as probabilistic context-free grammars (PCFGs) and extract
Bayes networks from the PCFGs to interpret observation
sequences.
Unfortunately, this approach suffers from the same limi-
tations on plan interleaving as Vilain’s. W&P propose that
probabilistic context-sensitive grammars (PCSGs) might
overcome this problem, but it is difﬁcult to deﬁne a prob-
ability distributionfor a PCSG [14].
Huber, et. al. [10] present an approach to keyhole plan
recognition for coordinating teams of agents based on the
Procedural Reasoning System(PRS)[7, 11]. PRS is a plan-
ning architecture that uses hierarchical plan speciﬁcations
very similar to our plan library and a reactive execution en-
gineto allowthe systemdesigner to buildagents that follow
the speciﬁed plans.
Huber’s algorithm automatically generates plan recog-
nition belief networks from PRS plan speciﬁcations. The
most important difference between our work and theirs is
that we obtain a simpler structure by working with the plan
representation directly, instead of generating a belief net-
work as an intermediate representation. Further, it is not
clear howthey handle the interleaving of multipleplans and
the development of plans over time.
In the following section we will describe our previous
work (GG&M)[8] on plan recognition and some additions
to it that were made for the network security domain. The
central motivations for our previous work are the same
shortcomings in previous plan recognition systems we have
pointed out in this section namely:
￿ partially-ordered plans and plan interleaving;
￿ multiple concurrent goals;
￿ actions used for multiple effects;
￿ evidence from the failure to observe expected actions;
￿ contextual inﬂuence on plan choice;
￿ consideration of multiple possible hypotheses
In the following section, we will provide a brief overview
of our system that handles these concerns and then turn to a
discussion of how to handle the issues raised by adversarial
plan recognition.
6. Recognition based on execution
The plan recognition framework developed in GG&M is
basedon therealizationthat plans areexecuted dynamically
and that at any given moment the agent is able to choose to
execute any of the actions that have been enabled by its pre-
vious actions. Thus, at any time an agent will have a pend-
ing set of actions that are enabled by its previous actions.
The agent is free to choose to execute any of the actions in
the current pending set.
To formalize this slightly, initially the executing agent
has a set of goals and chooses a set of plans to execute to
achieve these goals. The set of plans chosen determines the
set of pending primitive actions. As the episode proceeds,
theagentwillrepeatedlyexecute oneofthependingactions,
and generate a new set of pending actions from which fur-
ther actions will be chosen.
The new pending set is generated from the previous set
by removing the action just executed and adding newly en-
abled actions. Actions become enabled when their required
predecessors are completed. This process is illustrated in
Figure 2. To provide some intuition, the sequence of pend-
ing sets can be seen as a Markov chain, and the addition
of the action executions with unobserved actions makes it a
hidden Markov model.
To use this model to perform probabilistic plan recogni-
tion, we use the observations of the agent’s actions as an
execution trace. By stepping forward through the trace, and
hypothesizing goals the agent may have, we can generate
the agent’s resulting pending sets. Once we have reached
the end of the execution trace we will have the complete set
of pending sets that are consistent with the observed actions
and thesets of hypothesizedgoals that go with each ofthese
sets. Once we have this set we establish a probability distri-
bution over it. We can then determine which of the possible
goals the agent is most likely pursuing.
Notice that the observations of the agent’s actions are
used to construct the execution traces. In the case of hostile
agents, the observations will not, in general, be a complete
record of the execution trace. Instead it will be necessary to
consider execution traces containing unobserved actions.•˚ •
￿ ˚ •
•˚ •
￿ ˚ •
•˚ •
￿ ˚ •
C9705
￿
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Figure 2. Generation of pending sets.
Thistheory wasdesignedto handle: partiallyorderedac-
tions, overloaded actions, the effects of context, and nega-
tive evidence from not observingactions (i.e. the dog didn’t
bark). While some of these problems are partially handled
by other systems, no other system handles all of them. We
refer the reader to GG&M for a complete discussion of this
formalism. We will now consider extending this formalism
to the problems presented by hostile agents.
7. Problems with hostile agents
Existingwork on planrecognitionhas assumedcomplete
observability of the agent’s actions. Taking adversarial plan
recognition seriously means that we can no longer rely on
this. That is, we want to infer the goals of an agent given
that the behavior of the agent is only partially observable.
Earlier we pointed out requirements on systems that want
to move away from this assumption. They must be able
to infer unobserved actions from observed actions, and they
mustbeable to inferunobserved actionsfromstatechanges.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows, ﬁrst
we will discuss how we have added these two kinds of rea-
soningto oursystem. Wethendiscussour generalalgorithm
for plan inference, and we will conclude with a discussion
of the assumptions and limitations of the algorithm.
7.1. Inferring unobserved actions from observed
actions
Consider the following observations:
￿
gain-root,mod-webpage
￿
These two observations indicate with very high probability
that the hacker is engagedin both stealing informationfrom
a computer and defacing a webpage. We can conclude this
because these actions are members of disjoint plans, that is,
no single root goal will explain both of these actions.
However these actions are even more informative since
they are both unenabled by the observed actions. We deﬁne
an unenabled action is one that is observed without hav-
ing ﬁrst observed the actions the plan library speciﬁes must
come before it. In this case, the plan library speciﬁes that
recon and break-in must occur before gain-root or mod-
webpage. Therefore, in order to explain these two observa-
tions we must assume the execution of at least one instance
of recon and break-in each. Thus, these two actions pro-
vide evidence of two distinct plans:
(recon, break-in, mod-webpage)
and
(recon, break-in, gain-root)
Consider our model of plan recognition. Unenabled ac-
tions provide more information for us to use to reconstruct
the agent’s actual actions than other observations. They re-
quire that the action itself be in the sequence, but they also
provide evidence of unobserved actions. Consider gener-
ating the execution traces needed to produce the pending
sets for the last example. Not only does this set of obser-
vations allow us to prune out any execution sequence that
doesn’t contain a gain-root, followed sometime later by
a mod-webpage, but it also allows us to ignore any trace
that doesn’t have a recon followedby a break-in preceding
the gain-root. These unenabled actions are very important
pieces of information when attempting to infer the plans of
hostile agents.
Note that in this discussion, we have implicitly assumed
the agent can perform any action without detection, how-
ever in practice this is not true. Some actions are simply
harder to hide than others. For example, the probability that
a person could conduct a port scan of my machine with-
out my knowledge is much higher than the probability that
they could successfully carry out a denial of service attackagainst it without my noticing. In this framework it is triv-
ial to add probabilities about the likelihood of an agent per-
forming a speciﬁc action undetected.
7.2. Inferring unobserved actions from state
changes
Often, when it is possible to prevent an observer from
seeing the performance of an action, it is not possible to
prevent the observation of the action’s effects. In our net-
work security domain consider the clean action; the execu-
tion of the action might be hidden, but the deleting the log
ﬁles is very visible.
Reports of state changes can provide evidence of unob-
served actions that have the desired effect. From them we
can infer that the action has occurred before the report of
the state change. Reports of state change can also provide
conﬁrming information about a previously observed action.
Consider the following sequence of observations:
￿
recon,break-in,deleted-logs
￿
The report of the deleted event logs implies an unobserved
clean action. Further the ordering constraints in the plan
library imply that it must fall between the execution of
break-in and the report of deleted-logs. However, if the
sequence of observations were:
￿
recon, break-in, clean, deleted-logs
￿
The report would provide no extra information since it is
consistent with the observed actions. Like acquiring evi-
dence from unenabled actions these reports give more in-
formationabout theexecution tracesthat areconsistentwith
the observation.
7.3. The solution
The central idea behind our plan recognition algorithm
is the production of a probability distributionover the set of
all pending sets. This is generated using the observations as
an execution trace of the agent’s actions. Since each pend-
ing set is used in at least one execution trace, we generated
the pending sets by stepping through observations. In the
case of cooperative agents with complete and correctobser-
vations, this is sufﬁcient.
However, as we have pointed out, in the case of hostile
agents we face a problem with the execution traces. We
can no longer assume that the observation stream is com-
plete; it no longer represents the complete execution trace.
Instead, for each set of observations we must construct the
set of possible execution traces, inserting hypothesized un-
observed actions to complete them.
For easy implementation we have assumed a bound on
the number of unobserved actions. The next section dis-
cusses removing this assumption. Given a ﬁnite set of
primitive actions, bounding the number of unobserved ac-
tions provides a limit on the length and number of execu-
tion traces that must be considered. In the worst case we
only need to consider all execution traces whose length is
equal to the maximum number of unobserved actions plus
the number of observed actions. This sounds like a very
large search space, however we can prune this set of exe-
cution traces with the ordering constraints provided by the
observations.
Weareonlyinterestedinexecutiontracesconsistentwith
the observations, therefore if a sequence does not contain
all the observed actions or doesn’t obey the ordering con-
straints imposed by the sequence or plan library it cannot
generate one of the pending sets we are interested in and
therefore can be ﬁltered from consideration. The execution
traces can also be ﬁltered to be consistent with the unob-
served actions that are implied by unenabled actions and
observed state changes.
To summarize then, we handle hostile agents by extend-
ing the observed sequence of actions with hypothesized un-
observed actions consistent with both the observed actions,
observed state changes, and the plan graph to create a set of
possible execution traces. Then we followthe plan recogni-
tion algorithm as before. We use the set of execution traces
to construct the pending sets and then the probability distri-
bution over the sets of hypotheses of goals and plans impli-
cated by each of the traces and pending sets.
7.4. Example
The following example will illustrate this algorithm at a
high level. Consider the following set of action and state
change observations with a bound of three unobserved ac-
tions.
￿
break-in,deleted-logs
￿
Given these observations and the bound on unobservable
actions, the algorithm (implemented in Poole’s PHA [13])
walks forward through the list of observations, adding un-
observed actions as required to build a set of consistent ex-
ecution traces. To explain the given observations requires
the introduction of two unobserved actions, one to enable
the action break-in and one to cause the state change re-
ported in deleted-logs. The complete process results in 9
possible execution traces. The ﬁrst:
￿
recon,break-in,clean,deleted-logs
￿
is consistent with the agent not having executed any further
unobserved actions beyond those required to justify the ob-
servations. This trace is only consistent with the high level
goals of theft or vandalism.There are four traces that are consistent with the execu-
tionof a second unobservedrecon actionperformed at vari-
ouspointsin the sequence. These tracesare notshownhere,
however they would be consistent with the goal of pursuing
any two of the top level goals concurrently.
Of the four remaining traces:
(recon,break-in,gain-root, clean,deleted-logs)
and
(recon,break-in,clean,deleted-logs,gain-root)
are consistent only with the goal of theft. Note the ordering
differences due to the partial ordering in the plan library.
The ﬁnal two execution traces:
(recon,break-in,mod-webpage,clean,deleted-logs)
and
(recon,break-in,clean,deleted-logs,mod-webpage)
are consistent only with the goal of vandalism. Again, note
the ordering differences due to the partial ordering in the
plan library.
In constructing this set of possible execution traces PHA
has already established a probability distribution over the
explanations and establishes the most likely goal. In this
case, since the number of explanations for theft and van-
dalismareequal and thereare no environmental factorsthat
would weigh in favor of one over the other, these goals are
equally likely. The conjunctive plans of theft or vandalism
with info is a much less likely third alternative.
7.5. Assumptions
In our implementation of this algorithm we have made
two assumptions about the observation stream:
1. Thereis a ﬁxed andknownupperbound on thenumber
of unobserved actions.
2. The given observations are true and correctly ordered.
Neither of these assumptions is strictly necessary. We will
consider each of them in turn.
Boundingthe numberofpossible unobserved actionsen-
ables reasoning about where the agent could be in the exe-
cution of its plans. Suppose we bound the number of un-
observed actions at two, and we observe a break-in action.
This observation is not consistent with the agent having al-
readyexecuted steal. We have seen oneactionandtheagent
may have executed two more unobserved. The agent can
have executed a total of three actions. Since, steal is the
fourth step in its plan, the agent could not yet have executed
it.
Thisboundcanbe removed from thealgorithmin a num-
ber ofways including: running the algorithmmultipletimes
with increasing bounds or replacing the bound with a prob-
ability distribution over the number of unobserved actions
and weighing the execution traces accordingly. We see de-
termining the best way to remove this limitation as an area
for future work.
Second, we assumed that the observed actions happen
and in the order indicated by the sequence. Thus if we
have a sequence of three observations: recon, break-in,
and gain-root, we know recon happened before break-
in which happened before gain-root. The observation se-
quences are not assumed to be complete, therefore we can’t
conclude clean didn’t happen between break-in and gain-
root or even after gain-root. However, ordering constraints
provided by the planlibrary allowus to rule out somepossi-
bilities. For example, the ordering constraints allow us con-
clude that if clean did occur unobserved it couldn’t have
occurred before the break-in unless there were an earlier
unobserved break-in.
This assumption means we need not question the valid-
ity of observations. However, in environments with hostile
agents,thisassumptionmustbe questioned. Considera mil-
itary example, if we receive a report of troops massing at a
particular location, we must ﬁrst determine the validity of
the report before considering the effect this would have on
our assessment of the enemy’s goals. It is however straight-
forward to complicate the model by including a traditional
model of noisy observations.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have argued for extending IDSs with a
probabilistic model of plan recognition. We have identiﬁed
many requirements that are placed on the process of plan
recognitionby thenetworksecuritydomainand have shown
how our model of plan recognition based on plan execution
meets these requirements. These extensions remove a ma-
jor assumption of previous research in plan recognition and
signiﬁcantly broadens the domains where plan recognition
can be applied.
In future work we are interested in more advanced forms
of misdirection. Our current model still does not provide a
facility to represent that an agent may be engaging in ac-
tions solely to mislead the observer. Our model currently
must conclude that the agent does in fact intend to perform
the actions for the speciﬁed goal. In a sense this is correct;
the agent does intend the actions but not the resulting goal.
The agent only intends to mislead the observer rather than
achieve the goal.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our domain,
we are interested in disambiguating the goals of multiple
agents within the same observation stream. Any computer
network administrator would be thrilled if they only had to
deal with a single hacker at a time, however this is simply
not the case. For our work to be truly useful in this domain
we must be able to disambiguate multiple agents that maybe working together or separately.
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